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"Dewey's Theory of 3ense Peroei-tion"
I. Doctrine of Percej-tion in British Em^iriclsn .
The study of any theory of sense percei^tion is apt to
he considered hy the ordinary man as the appropriate study for
psychology and out of the sphere of philosophy. As a matter of
fact, however, a man's philosophical belief rests largely, if
not T^holly, on his understanding of sense perception and his
belief as to the content of everyday experience. If we can de-
fine exactly hovr we exierience any object of perception, our
philosophical i-rogram is mapped out for us in the beginning, and
later problems will more or less depend on this first definition.
In the British Empiricists we have a splendid example of the in-
fluence of an assumption as to the nature of perception and its
effect on^whole system of philosophy, for having started with
their peculiar doctrine of sensations they travel an identical
road, and, if logical, would end in scepticism along with Hume.
Locke starts out in his "Essay on the Human Understand-
ing" with the fundamental proposition that everything that we
know comes from experience, but hardly gets started before he
makes the assumption, which Descartes had made before him, of a
mind placed somewhere as a sort of brewing pot into which percep-
tions are introduced from the outside world, there to combine
with other perceptions and form simple ideas and these again com-
bine with complex ideas. Having started with objects, h© immed-
iately separates the object from the idea of it, putting the
latter into his rece^^tacle-mind; and re have t^o things.- (1)
object and {£) idea copying object, the truth of the idea con-
sisting in the measure in which it resembles the object. What

we inevitably see in j^eroeption, then, is not the ohjeot or the
world of things, but merely peroei^tion and ideas in the mind and
if the world were suddenly erased after our perceptions had been
safely stored aray, we should never be the wiser for it. There
is no possible T7ay of getting into contact with the world if we
assume mental states at the start, for in that case mental states
are all we ever know and our world is a sort of necessary back-
ground with which we never come into contact. Material substance
or matter, is for Locke simply a name, a necessary "unknown", the
glue which holds together the sensations in order to form ideas.
As sensation^, according to his conception, come in singly from
the different sense organs, there seems to be no principle to
unite them to form any unit, so some such thing as material
substance is a necessary postulate, even the undefinable. It
means to him merely the "unknown support of attributes." James
pointed out the fact, however, that we never have separate sen-
sations as such, but that we start in psychology with a "blooming
buzzing confusion" and analyze out sensations later, thus doing
away with the need for any substance in which they shall inhere.
Locke's spiritua substance is just as unintelligible, it being
the background for the process of willing and thinking, the
unitary self in which these processes take place. He defines the
self as active and non-extended, a contradiction in terms at the
very start. Such a concej^tion is the same as "round-square", for
action as we know it only takes ,,lace in s^ace, and action which
is non-extended is entirely unintelligible. Such a concej^tion is
merely an assumption which is not logically defined and to proceed
on such a basis means ruin.

Berkeley starts out by eliminating one evil, that of
material substance, irhich he sees to be unnecessary because mean-
ingless. His fundamental princiile - "Esse est i^erciif" - puts
us on our feet in that we can talk in experimental terms and need
not dig behind exj^erience for reality. He sees clearly that the
thing omitted is merely an abstraction and useless in helping us
to get reality, but in order that the world have stability of
any sort, he postulates a spiritual substance, a God that shall
be experiencing this world when none of us happen to be doing so,
and thus gets into the difficulties that he tried to escape. He
finds this spiritual substance necessary to cause the perceptions
over which we have no control, there being a difference in ideas
which we produce thru our will and others that are presented to
us immediately upon opening our eyes; and after eliminating the
copying process in the case of material substance^r oceeds to
copy his spiritual substance. Our ideas are only true in so far
as they are like those in the mind of the Absolute, and then
comes the difficulty of matching them up. Perceptions of the
same thing being varied at different times, how can you know which
idea is copying the idea in the mind of the Absolute? And aside
from this cuestion,
-hat does it mean to say our minds are in-
cluded in the mind of the Absolute or that his experience takes
in our own? TTe cannot conceive of Him experiencing our trifling
pain and disappointment but if he experiences them differently
than we do, then they are no longer our experiences. We can only
speak of the part or the whole spatially and cannot force exper-
ience into spatial boundaries.
Hume realized these difficulties and struck out spirit-

ual substance as being an abstraction on the same i-lane with
Lockefe material substance, but stiii^/the old idea of sei.arate
sensations located in a mind. Having no background whatever, he
reduces the world simily to a irooession of sensations and there
is no possibility of finding a reality behind the i^assing moment.
You never kno\r anything beyond your own fleeting ideas and can
not even get objects without assuming a mind, which assumi-tion
he makes when he explains belief as a matter of imagination. He
describes the process of getting an idea of any separate unit or
object in this way: we get sensations of color. touch etc. from
a table, for instance, and when at later times these same sensa-
tions a^.pear together, we let our imaginations run along the series
and call it one. We form our own object thru this imagination and
have no means of getting knowledge beyond sensations. As a matter
of fact, however, there must be sornething beyond single im-
pressions
,
for no one impression can see the similarity between
them all; and though he does not realize it, Hume assumes all
the while a mind to take in his impressions. He talks of bundles
of impressions, not thinking that a bundle is impossiiile without
a string to hold it together. Even he cannot get away from the
idea of a receptacle mind and hence falls into the same difficult-
ies. The trouble seems to be in having two orders, subjective
and objective; objects to be kno-^ and a mind to know them, the
knowing process being a direct grasping of object by the mind and
hence a theoretical affair. If you start with that sort of a
mind and proceed logically, you always end with Hume and even if
you are satisfied with the proposition that all knowing is i
possible^you still are on illogical grounds.
.m-
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II. Jev.-ey
'
s Criticism and Relnterj.retat ion of the Reflex Arc
Theory.
In present day theories we have less emphasis on mental
states as such and more discussion of bodily res^-onse and adaptive
movement, due, to a large extent, to the influence of evolutionary
doctrines. The unit for psychological investigation is not the
idea in the mind, hut the reflex arc, consisting of sensation-
followed-hy-idea-followed- by-movement. The adaptation of the
body to environment claims a much wider attention, but adaptation
always reduced to this simplest of nervous structures, the
reflex arc. If v-e interpose the parts of the reflex arc as
sej^arate and distinct entities, however, we have the same sort of
dualism on our hands and the impossibility of relating stimulus
and response.
Dewey says in "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology" *:
"The older dualism between sensation and idea is repeated in the
current dualism of peripheral and central structures and functions
the older dualism of body and soul finds a distinct echo in the
current dualism of stimulus and response. Instead of inter- reting
the character of sensation, idea, and action from their place and
function in the sensori-motor circuit, we still incline to inter-
pret the latter from our j^reconceived anl preformulat ed ideas of
rigid distinctions between sensations, thoughts and acts. The
sensory stimulus is one thing, the central activity, standing for
the idea, is another thing, and the motor discharge standing for
the act proper, is a third. As a result, the reflex arc is not a
comprehensive, or organic unity, but a patchwork of disjointed
Psychological Review Vol. III.

i-arts, a mechanical conjunction of unallied i-rocesses. What io
needed is that the irinciple underlying the idea oi" the reflex
arc as the fundamental i^sychical unity shall react into and
determine the values of its constitutive factors. More specifi-
cally, what is wanted is that sensary stimulus, central connect-
ions and motor responses shall be viewed, not as separate and
Gomilete entities in themselves, but as divisions of labor,
functionary factors, within the single concrete whole, now desig-
nated the reflex arc."
And again:" the reflex arc idea, as commonly
employed, is defective in that it assumes sensary stimulus and
motor responses as distinct psychical existence, while in reality
they are always inside a coordination and have their significance
purely from the part played in maintaining or reconstituting the
coordination. The result is that the reflex arc idea
leaves us with a disjointed psychology, whether viewed from the
standpoint of developeraent in the individual or in the race, or
from that of the analysis of the mature consciousness. As to the
former, in its failure to see that the arc of which it talks is
virtually a circuit, a continual reconstitution, it breaks con-
tinuity and leaves us nothing but a series of jerks, the origin
of each jerk to be sought outside the process of experience itself
in either an external pressure of environment or else in an un-
accountable spontaneous variation from within the 'soul" or the
'organism'. As to the latter, failing to see the unity of
activity, no matter ho^ much it may prate of unity, it still
leaves us with sensations or peripheral stimulus; idea, or central
process (the equivalent of attention); and motor response, or act
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as three disoonnectod existenoes, having to be somehow adjusted to
each other, T^'hether thru the intervention of an extra- exj-erimental
soul, or hy mechanical push and ^ull."
Thus we see that although present theories presuppose
a real hody and disclaim the belief that reality lies rithin the
ideas of the mind, they do not escape the old difficulties. If
the stimulus or object has a separate existence, distinct from
idea and body, we have the same problem of knoTr^ledge on our hands
in establishing a relation between object and idea of it. We
find ourselves with only perceptions and mental states as long as
we think of object over against a knowing process T^hich is
essentially different in kind. The new dualism presents as
great difficulties as the old and we must interp-ret the relation
of object and body, stimulus and response. De^^ey suggests this
in his "Reflex Arc Concept" - "— movement is only for the sake
of delivering the stimulus, of fixing what kind of a stimulus it
is, of interpreting it." "Stimulus and response are not distinct-
ions of existence, but teleological distinctions, that is,
distinctions of function, or part flayed, with reference to reach-
ing or maintaining an end." "The stimulus is something to be
discovered; to be made out" "moreover, it is the motor response
which assists in discovering and constituting the stimulus"; and
we shall try to describe that process of re-constituting the
stimulus which is the essence of perception. That function of the
stimulus in a conscious situation can be seen to advantage by
comparing conscious with reflex behavior and finding out the
essential difference in the two experiences.
* Psychological Heview, Vol. III.
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In reflex action '••e have a stimulus aj.plied to the body
and the aipropriate movement issrdng without deliberation or choice
simply as a mechanical unrolling with no aj-preciation of end or
purpose. It is a "pull-the-string-and-the-body-movea" affair and
cannot be distinguished from mechanical movement such as Punch
and Judy actors perform when their appropriate strings are pulled.
There is no hesitation on the application of the stimulus, for
the bodily responses have already been so organized that they
roll off the reel in a definite order, and each subseCjUent time
that a like stimulus is applied we may expect the same reaction
on the side of the body. In a rather complicated reflex, such as
eating, each movement follows in succession, and there is no flow-
ing of stomach juices on the entrance of food into the mouth or
a contraction of muscles in the throat to produce swallowing.
Only r-hen the food reaches the throat and stomach do those process
es start up, so we may truly say there is no reflection of the
last act in the first, but merely a mechanical unrolling of one
act after another, the process being identical each time the same
stimulus is applied. There seems to be nothing in reflex action,
then, that could not be reproduced in machinery simply by arranging
an order of events which shall follow in succession thru an initia
push. Reflex is just like firing a gun, and there is an end or
purpose only in the sense of later interpretations of function.
But the moment consciousness comes in there is a change in bodily
behavior. In the first place we notice a hesitation, a holding
up of responses. Instead of a succession of movement^, we have
no response which is adequate or complete^but a number of inci-
pient responses which get in each other's way and block each other.

9.
If one had eaten a i-ieoe of food which suddenly had a suspiolous
taste, there '^ould be an arrest of resi-onse, the next act of
swallowing would not take place "but neither would the food he
exj-elled from the mouth instantaneously; the two movements would
be arrested until the nature of the food was discovered and then
if it happened to be poison it ^-ould be eXj^elled, otherwise
swallowed. In a simple experiment such as the raising of the
hand on someone sho^-'ing a certain color, there is not absolute
quiet in the body until the right color appears, but a reaction,
a tension of arm muscles and preparation for response before any
color appears. There is an expectancy on the side of the body
which is nowhere ^resent in reflex action and this delay of
response, movements blocking each other until organization occurs,
is the distinguishing mark of consciousness dn the side of the
body.
But now what about the stimulus in the two cases? Is
there a difference between a conscious stimulus and a stimulus
to reflex action? At least, the latter seems to be more adequate
in that it allows instantly a completely arranged set of responses
to follow it, with no apparent effort of adjustment or any fric-
tion between them. The responses are not held up as they are wher-
ever a conscious stimulus presents itself, and rhenever a stimulus
is made over so as to allow a complete organization of response,
we have what we may call a temporary reflex. The stimulus seems to
be as important a factor as the responses , and the distinguishing
mark of a conscious stimulus is its inadequacy to bring about a
complete organization of response. Any stimulus which sends you
after a better stimulus, ("better" meaning one having the power of
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thus organizing resjjonses,) v/e may oall a consciour; stimulus.
Such a stimulus exerts some po'-er
,
for it directs your resj^onses
in a certain way, though not entirely controlling them. For in-
stance, when you shout "Look" and i^oint to a corner of a room,
the looking is in a certain direction though at nothing in ^.arti-
cular, tintil something aj. pears to ^''.'hich you can respond or else
nothing comes ui- and you can settle into rej-ose again. A con-
scious stimulus has a forward reference, meaning that at each
movement it points to the next stimulus and that if this power
of j^rediction were taken from it, part of its essence would be
gone. Its being in consciousness means it is doing something to
relieve the tension in the experimental situation where both
object and body are in a sort of unstable equilibrium. Whenever
this activity of foretelling is not found in things, -rrhen the end
of any bodily process is not present in the beginning, leading
it to fulfillment, then the action is reflex and simply rolls off
the reel.
It is important to notice that stimulus and response
develop hand in hand and not independently, and a concrete ex-
ample will illustrate this fact to best advantage. Take an in-
stance of conscious action such as getting up from a table, going
to a window and climbing up on a chair to open it. Say you have
first, due to a feeling of warmth, the window opened as a means
by which the matter can be remedied. The moment window appears
in the situation, however, the reaction has started, and there is
no simple sensation appearing to the eye which causes a response,
making another stimulus, and such a see-sawing of sensation and
movement. There is no set order of (1) sensory stimulus and
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(C) motor response, such as the old reflex arc theory described,
but on the side of the body there is the beginning of the move-
ment of rising, ^miking, stepping, pulling, and these have to be
organized before anything can happen; otherwise they ;7ould neutral-
ize each other as the mechanical movement of a wooden man rrhen
you pulled all his strings at once. They do not readjust them-
selves "on their own hook" however, the stimulus renaining
"just window" all the time, but the future is j^resent in the
window just as it is really present in the responses. The vdndow
is a stimulus which is looking toward the next stimulus, one of
its qualities being the forecast it gives into the future, and if
you subtract from the experience of ^^indow at this moment the
element of the future embodiedjin it, you have not told the whole
story about it. VJindow figures in ray experience not merely as
glass surrounded by wood, but as an obstruction, the removal of
which will let in freshycool air, and that future is just as much
a present experience to me as the experience of wood and glass.
But although the end is present in the beginning^in the sense that
at the start the stimulus is "window-to-be-opened-by-rising,
-
walking,- etc.", yet that stimulus does not remain identical thru-
out the process. To be sure, it is "window-to-be-opened" all the
time but having gotten on my feet it is now "window-to-be-opened-
by-walking-etc", a stimulus which has been determined both by
the j-art ial responses of the body and by the fo rmer stimulus .
There is a simultaneous developeraent of both stimulus and response
and though it might seem that the change on the side of the
stimulus was only superficial, borrovdng its significance at each
moment from the corresponding change of bodily response, yet this
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neoessary explanation of one side of the exp erlence in terme of
the other comes from trying to separate the two intimately connect-
od phases of the same experience. It is not possible to line the
progress of stimulus parallel with progress of body and explain
each independently, for the two are bound together into a situa-
tion ".'hich is the unit of experience. Of course "experience",
as object of consciousness, can be described independently for
some purposes, but in the organic situation, stimulus can no more
be stripped of its function of control than resj,onse can be ex-
plained without stimulus. That very fact of relationship with
the body is the essence of the distinction betreen object in itself
or out of consciousness, and object as perceived in consciousness.
In the former case, a chair not seen, for instance, has all the
qualities of color, height, size, etc., that it has when in con-
sciousness but only when it begins to function in controlling
bodily behavior does it become a conscious object. To describe
it independently then, or aside from its relations to body, is to
describe in terms of chemistry and physics and not in terms of
perception. The relation of stimulus and response is constant
and not intermittent; there is not a see-sawing back and forth
between stimulus and response in the process of perception, but
both change simultaneously, the seiaration being only an arbitrary
one made necessary by the attempt to describe in detail.
It might be well to take a case of forming a "temporary
reflex", such as ve have used as an example of conscious behavior
and see ho-'/ far it is really reflex and in what sense it is only
a metaphor. In the case of opening the window, for instance, the
action is reflex in that each step follows the former and all are

connected so as to follow in j.'roi er order. The end in viev; is
sufficiently concrete to give direction to the action and to
organize each step so as to form a well-ordered act; and yet in
a"temj-orary reflex" the stimulus has not become as adequate to
the situation as a reflex stimulus, so as to simply start the
process and then drop out of the game, hut it is active all the
ray along and is changing its function each moment. Change of
function does not mean a break in the process, however, for the
process of organizing the resi.onses is continuous and forms a
comi-lete unit. The name "temporary reflex" is appropriate in
that the act as a whole is a complete organization of responses,
each occurring in its proper place, and t hus resembling a reflex;
but it is distinctly not reflex in that the successive steps are
not determined beforehand so as to roll off the reel mechanically,
with no reference to stimulus during the process. After the tale
is told we see B C in pure succession, but the significant
thing about the process on the way, is the fact that B and C
modify A and the stimulus is not sifri^^ly a primal push, but a
guide thruout the process. Whenever a stimulus is inactive; when
it has been so organized beforehand that it need only to start
the process and the complete act follows, then we have reflex
action and are on the plane of habit, with no necessity for con-
sciousness or thinking. There is no friction between responses
tut sufficient organization for complete reaction without the
aid of a guide.
In conscious action, however, such friction is real and
the tangle of responses we talk about is a physiological fact.
Take the instance of a man in a prize fight watching his opponent 'a
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movements, ready to rush in or -.".Ithdraw. He is not airni-ly watch-
ing his man with his body relaxed waiting for a stimulus toward
which to react, but his watching is divided and modified by tvo
or more incomj-atible tyi.es of subsequent behavior. He is ready
for all of them; in fact, several movements are already going on,
but as they involve opposite play of muscles, nothing happens as
long as they are in opposition. The impulse to rush in cancels
the impulse to withdraw-' and there is strain and tension but no
action until the stimulus changes into one torard which he can
react. At each moment, then, there is exiectation and no complete
reaction until an adequate stimulus is offered. There is not
(1) sensory stimulus and (£J motor response, but as Dewey suggests
an organic circuit in which all the responses start up at once,
and from a situation in which the responses act "into the stimulus,
modifying it and being modified by it in turn."
Dewey describes in detail hovr responses act into a
stimulus, in his "Keflex Arc Concept". He takes the example of the
child who is attracted by a lighted candle, reaches for it, and,
being burned, withdran^s its hand. "The ordinary inter^.retati on
would say the sensation of light is a stimulus to the grasping as
a response, the. burn resulting in a stimulus to withdrawing the
hand as response and so on. Upon analysis we find that ^e
begin not rith a sensary stimulus, but with a sensori-raotor co-
ordination, the optical-ocular, and that in a certain sense it is
the movement which is primary, and the sensation which is second-
ary, the movement of body, head and eye muscles determining the
quality of vhat is experienced. In other words, the real beginning
is with the act of seeing; it is looking, and not a sensation of
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light. The sensory quale gives the value of the act, Just as
the movement furnishes its mechanism and control, out both sensa-
tion and movement lie inside, not outside the act."
"Ho'.r if this act, the seeing, stimulates another act,
the reaching, it is because both of these acts fall within a larger
co-ordination; because seeing and grasj.ing have been so often
bound together to reinforce each other, to help each other out,
that each may be considered j^ractically a subordinate member of a
bigger co-ordination. More s-^ecifi cally , the ability of the hand
to do its work will depend, either directly or indirectly, upon
its control, as well as its stimulation, by the act of vision. If
the sight did not inhibit as well as excite the reaching, the
latter vould be purely indeterminate, it ";ould be for anything or
nothing, not for the particular object seen. The reaching, in
turn, must both stimulate and control the seeing. The eye must
be kept upon the candle if the arm is to do its work; let it
wander and the arm takes up another task. In other words, re norr
have an enlarged and transformed co-ordination; the act is seeing
no less than before, but it is now seeing-for-reaching purposes.
There is still a sensori-motor circuit, one \rith more content or
value, not a substitution of a motor response for a sensory
stimulus.
^*lJow take the affair at its next stage, that in which the
child gets burned. It is hardly necessary to point out again that
this is also a sensori-motor co-ordination and not a mere sensatior
.
It is worth while, however, to note especially the fact that it
is simj^ly the completion or fulfillment of the previous eye-arra-
hand co-ordination and not an entirely new occurrence. Cnly
'J
IG.
because the hent-pr.in qii:ilo oiiLorc into t ho camo circuit of
experience with the optlcal-oculi.'r and muscular quales does the
child learn from the experience and get the ability to avoid the
experience in the future.
"Llore technically stated, the so-called response is not
merely tjo the stimulus; it is into it. The burn is the original
seeing, the original optical-ocular experience enlarged vnCL trans-
formed in its value. It is no longer mere seeing; it is seeing-of
a-light-thf t-means-pain-when-contact-occur s. The ordinary reflex
arc theory proceeds upon the more or less tacit assumption that
the outcome of the response is totally new experience; that it
is, say, the substitution of a burn sensation for a light sensa-
tion tliru the intervention of motion. The fact is that the sole
meaning of the intervening movement is to maintain, reinforce or
transform (as the case may be) the original quale; that we do not
have the replacing of one sort of experience by another, but the
development for as it seems convenient to term it) the mediation
of an experience. The seeing, in a word, remains to control the
reaching, and is, in turn, interpreted by the burning."
This idea of organic circuit is upheld by C. Judson
Herrick, a noted neurologist in the University of Chicago. I
shall quote passages from "Some Reflections on the Origin and
Significance of the Cerebral Cortex" in 'The Journol of Animal
Behavior" to show the support he gives to Dewey's theory of
organic circuit. He says - "In the organic circuit as defined by
Dewey the process is considered as a whole so that the response
is conceived as logically implicit in the stimulus. The
motor reaction
,
he says, i s not merely to the stimulus; it is
*i.iay-June, 1913. '
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into the stimulus. 'It occurs to change the sound, to get rid of
it.' '7;hat 're have Is a circuit, not an arc, or broken segment
of a circle. This circuit is more truly termed organic than
reflex, because the motor resi^onse determines the stimulus, just
as truly as sensory stimulus determines movement.' This motion,
which is difficult for the ^^ractical scientific mind to under-
stand, is considerably clarified by some neurological considera-
tions.
"From the standj^oint of the cerebral cortex considered
as an essential j^art of the mechanism of higher conscious acts,
every afferent stimulus, as ^e have seen, is to some extent affects
by its passage thru various subcortical association centers
(i.e., it carries a quale of central origin). But this same
afferent impulse in its passage thru the si-inal cord and brain
stem. may, before reaching the cortex, discharge collateral impuls-
es into the lower centers of reflex co-ordination, from which
incipient (or even actially consummated) motor responses are dis-
charged previous to the cortical reaction. These motor discharges
may, thru the 'back-stroke' action, in turn exert an influence
upon the slo^r cortical reaction. Thus the lo^rer reflex response
may in a literal physiological sense act into the cortical
stimulus complex and become an integral ia rt of it."
And again, '•V/e sa^^ in a previous paragraph horr the
simple reflexes of the spinal cord may become factors in the
stimulus complex of the cortex. Here we find, conversely, that
the efferent cortical discharge may become a factor in the local
reflex stimulation of a motor spinal neurone. Prom both stand-
points, Dewey's conception of the unitary nature of the organic
circuit, as contrasted with the classical reflex arc concept
Ik
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receives strong support."
Dewey's theory of percej-tlon, then, seems to accord
with the facts of neurology and to "be literally true in a phys-
iological sense. This is an imj,ortant point to notice, for when
we "begin to explain perception in terras of bodily behavior and
talk about nervous system and brain structure accounting for
meanings thru which we interpret our world, our opponent almost
immediately asks just how much we do know about brain structure
and if such an explanation is any more enlightening than his
theory of mental states. In the former case, however, we can at
least keej, our finger on the thing to some extent and know ¥;hat
we are talking about when we si.eak of nervous reaction, while
mental states have never yet been definitely defined. If we can
be secure in our starting point, then, it seems safe to keep
travelling on that road, and the significant thing about Herrick's
article is the reassurance of an expert as to our method or pro-
cedure.
In cases of percej,tion such as we have described, we
have what Dewey calls the process of "reconstituting the stimulus'^
and it might be well to quote him exactly from "Perception and
Organic action" *, where he contrasts his view of perception with
that of Bergson. He says, "the stimulus or perceived object is
a part of the process of determining the response; nay, in its
growing comi-leteness
, it is the determining of the resj^onse. As
soon as an integral and clear-cut object stands out, then the
response is decided and the only intelligent way of choosing
response is by forming its stimulus. Meantime organic responses
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology & Scientific Methods, Vol. IX.
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have not been posti-oned; a variety of them are going on, by means
of rhich the environing conditions are given the status of a
stimulus. The change effected in the environment by the final
total organic act is just the consummation of the j-artial changes
effected all thru the irocess of perceition by the i-artial re-
actions that finally determine a clear-cut object of erce^^tion
.
This means that the perceived subject matter at every lOint in-
dicates a response that has taken effect with a reference to its
character in determining further response. It exhibits v^hat the
it,
organism has done, but exhibits/with the qualities that attach
to it as part of the process of determining what the organism is
to do. If at any point vre let go of the thread of the process of
the organism's determining its o^-n eventual total response thru
determining the stimulus to that response by
_i series of partial
responses, we are lost."
Such a process of reconstitution is just vrhat v^e have
described in instances given, and it seems clear that such a
making over of stimulus doee occur in these special cases; but
suppose we take any ordinary case of i-erception where there is no
protracted act involved and try to find these elements of ex-
pectancy, of prevision and guidance in it. You may readily acqui-
esce that for a man in a prize fight the stimulus is in constant
change and that in a real way it foresees the future in guiding
him tovrard a complete response thru partial responses, but what
about seeing a table or responding to the simple stimulus of a
voice shouting "Look"? Is there any element of expectancy there,
and is the future in any way involved in such cases? It seems to
me Just here our theory fits beautifully, for, as a matter of fact.
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whon the table catohos ray eyo it is either to be looked at
further or else to be ignorod in order to puy attention to some-
thing else. If neither of these two things happens v/o simply
respond reflexly : nd are not conscious of t.'ible as such. If on
the other hand any one shouts "Look" there would be very little
possibility for reflex ind the conscious roaction would take
either of these two forms. If the stimulus is not ignored and
blotted out in order to attend to something else - motor pre-
paration for that "something else" being then present - it must
be starting motor responses for future acts to come. In the
latter case the object is really pointing out the future, and
not only that, but the future responses have already started
no\7 in the present. Again, when you speak a sentence each 7;ord
is colored by the word coming after it and when you break off in
the midst of it and contemplate a single word its significance
changes immediately. A good test of actual pre -visioning is to
ask at any moment for an inventory of someone's mind, and in-
evitably he will be puzzled to tell you. If he coul"
describe this moment in terms- of the next, he could answer the
requirements, but any sudden holding up of thought finds a blank,
for perception and thinking depend upon responses which are
starting now toward a future act and any holding up of response,
cutting off the future, leaves an empty void. In the most ordi-
nary perception, then, there is always expectancy of some sort,
a real foreseeing on the part of the stimulus, and whenever the
future is not involved we heve merely reflex action. Any object
that catches the eye, then, or any stimulus whatever th .t enters
our environment, is not a stationary stimulus to which we make

a motor rosionse in the order of succession, but in case the
action is not reflex, there is involved a irei>aration for the
next act to come. We look in order to see trhat is coming next
or else cease looking in order to look elsevhere; in hoth cases
the future functions in the i resent informing motor resi-onses
Tvhich are in their turn to determine the future stimulus.
III. De?:ey' s Conce.'-tion of Consciousness .
The differentia of a conscious situation is ai:j.arently
something that the object does, the function of controlling bodily
resi-'onses to^rd an end in view, and consciousness as a state is
nowhere discoverable. We find motor responses of a very delicate-
ly adjusted organism and a stimulus r-hich is constantly active in
controlling this body, but any other entity
-vhich stands outside
these two and looks on, claiming them both as its belongings,
does not fit into the story. Hot only is it useless, but no one
who ever i^ostulated such a thing has been able to tell just what
he meant by it. It is an assumption which the intellect has
made and is not only unexplainable but no one yet has described
it so we know what it means or can in any way put our finger on
it. It must be a supernatural agency of some sort then, and if
we explain perception by it, we are attempting to explain what
we know in terms of what we do not know. A soul or self which
shall somehov' "take in" objects not only complicates the matter
but we find in the end that the things possessed are not objects
at all but merely copies of them, ideas in the mind. Having
ideas, There shall we get in touch with our world? There seems
to be no point of contact and the wise thing to do is to start

with the world and take exijerienoe as we find it, putting all
assumj- tions out-of-door: then you escaie the difficulties of
Looke, Berkeley and Hurae.
We shall then find that consciousness is a term we use
',^hen speaking of the relation between ohjects and body when the
object is i-erforming this function of controlling behavior, and is
in reality an adjective rather than a noun. Y/e can talk about
it as ^^e do of black and white, annexing it in the same way to
objects and experiences, but it never occurs as a sej^arate exist-
ence. We can i,roj,erly s^-eak of conscious objects just we do of
black or round objects. and the difference between a conscious and
not-conscious object is only a matter of function. Having set
out to find consciousness, we discover that the only intelligible
thing you can say of it is to describe the conditions under ^^hich
it occurs, the important thing being the function of object in
controlling bodily behavior. If you ask wh^ i-erception occurs
under these conditions, there is no more answer than to the query
of why the color red appears with certain light waves and a
certain eye structure or why water freezes at 32 degrees i^ahrenheit
An exj^lanation of any phenomem aside from description of conditions
involved is iiTipossible unless you bring in the supernatural as
efficient cause, and we refuse to go outside experience. Though
you may say red is only a name arbitrarily used to signify a
certain relationship between light imves and eye, in like manner
consciousness becomes a name, and as a noun stands only for function
of object. Consciousness must not be identified with either object
or body apart from each other, however, for such an identification
would be as unjust as to say red is_ li^ht ^mves or is_ eye, for
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OYidontly it ! neither of the tv/o but a certain relation between
them. Such an interpretation leads to the accusation made by sone
opponents that this view reduces all life to physiology, but
such is not the case. If life were narror/ed down to nervous
energy and that alone, all values would disappear and we should be
left barren indeed, but the one thing to be kept in mind is the
function of the object and the play of environment on the human
body. If the introduction of a self or soul as a psychical entity
would give any more richness to life or explain perception in a
more intelligible way, then v/e should be more reconciled to have
dealings with it, but aside from the f-jct that wo do not know the
meaning of such an entity, it gets us into difficulties whenever
we assume it.
IV. The Bearing of this V i ew on the Problem of Knowledge .
Thruout the history of philosophy the problem of knowledge
has been the possibility of cvor getting the real, and the diffi-
culties here, as well as in the matter of perception, have turned
on the assumption of a mind or mental states. If we assume a
knov/ing process which is essentially different from things to bo
known, then experience must conform to the nature of this process,
*
and reality behind experience is unknowable. As Dewey says,
"Epistemology makes the possibility of knowledge a problem because
it assumes back of knowledge conditions ineompnt ible with the
obvious traits of knowledge as it empirically exists. These
assumptions are that t?ie organ or instrument of knowledge is not
a natural object, but some ready-made state of mind or conscious-
*
~~ ~~
The Experimental Theory of Knowledge
.
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ness, something purely 'subjective', a i^eculiar kind of exi^tance
'.rhich livea, moves, and has its being in a realm different from
things to be known; and that the ultimate goal and content of
knowledge is a fixed, ready-made thing which has no organic connec
tions with the origin, purpose and growth of the attempt to know
it, some kind of *Ding-an-sich
' or absolute, extra- emj, irical
'Reality'".
According to the older view knowing is a direct grasping
of reality, static and unchanging, the supposition being that
thin^^s remained entirely unaffected by the process of knowing.
Whenever you leave the object static, however, you arc involved
in difficulties immediately, for some change undeniably occurs
in any sort of knowing and the problem is to locate the change.
The usual solution has been that the ideas in the mind, which are
more or less perfect copies of objects, go thru a process of
change while the object is unaffected. In any case of simple per-
ception, for instance, my ideas of tables and chairs change
according to my point of view, but somehow underneath all these
copies of objects there is a reality, an object-in-itself
, T^-hich /
"stay put" in order that we may be able to talk about it at all.
If we are to deal with the world it must stay much the same from
moment to moment, and in case of a radical change of any sort we
no longer call objects by the same names. If there is no thing-
in-itself to put our finger on, the
--orld of objects might seem
to go dancing off before our eyes, leaving us helpless with mere
illusions concerning it? so for practical purposes some sort of
stability is necessary. If we treat the stability as absolute,
however, allowing no change in the object, we are forced into the
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dilemma of a dualism betv/eon the world and our exxeriences of that
world, and the i^osition that it is imj,ossihle to kno^- reality.
Intellectualists will not admit a dualism, but if we leave objects
unchanged by the process of knowing and essentially different in
kind from that process, there is no way of escai^ing it. If what
I exj..erience is only idea of object or something which has been
made to conform to the nature of the mind, then the object-in-
itself can never be known as such. In thinking we always get
some kind of a rei resentat ion but not the real, and it is a i ro-
blem indeed to discover any means of reaching noumena behind
j^henomenal existence. Reality consists not in exj^erience but
in something behind, and what I get in iercei-tion is only a fleet-
ing picture of reality. This sort of knowing is of a photograi-hic
tyj,e when the mind stands outside exi.erience taking snai-Shots of
the real, but having only snai^shots in the end. The eternal
question remains "V/Tiat is anything aside from its appearance?",
and in that form it is unanswerable.
Suppose, however, that we allow the object to change in
some resj-ects such as we have described in our theory of percep-
tion, and state the i-roblem of knowledge not as what it is but
as what it does
. If we give up trying to discover what anything
is aside from its function in experience, our problems are solved.
T;e no longer seek for reality behind experience but turn our -hole
attention on to the kind of stimulus which ^resents itself, and
when the nature of the stimulation is known there is no longer
any question of the real behind the experience- as we have it.
Describing^Ob ject in terms of function, we can investigate the
various functions it j^erforms and collect data concerning it,
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"but never can ^."e kno^v the " thing-in-itself" .
Dewey claims reality for objects as '"e ox^erienoe them
when he says{*) - "things anything, everything, in the ordinary
or non-technical use of the term 'things' are what they are
exi- erienced as. Hence, if one wishes to describe anything truly,
his tasks is to tell v;hat it is experienced as being." Suj-pose
that several j^eople have different experiences, then, "if these
accounts turn out differently in some resj^ects as well as con-
gruous in others, there. is no reason for assuming the content of
the one to be exclusively 'real', and that of the others to be
'phenomenal'." Any experience is just as real as any other and
the question to be asked is not, "Jo I see the things as it is?",
but rather "Will the stimulus lead me right?", and when we ansr^er
the latter, we are dealing with the problem of truth.
Knowledge, then, becomes a practical rather than a
theoretical affair and to know a thing is to be able to use it.
Thinking is no longer a method of grasping reality in its inmost
nature, but a manipulation of things in order to move about among
them. As Dewey says (**), "knowing is that way of bringing things
to bear upon things which we call reflection - a manipulation of
things experienced in the light one of another." In the kno?7^ing
, , .
,
ing
process things change in some ways while remain/static in others
and the purpose of knowledge is so to relate exj^eriences as to
form an environment which is familiar and workable. The problem
of knowing a reality behind experience drops out, for such an
existence becomes a foolish postulate and our problems deal only
* The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism.
Experimental Theory of Knowledge.
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with stimuli and thei r leadings. We have no creation of an unex-
tended mental entity in the act of percejjtion, but sim^ily a mani-
festation of a form of control over a living organism. From this
standpoint the nature of reality is a question that ceases from
troubling, since the opposition between appearance and reality
disappears and the real is perceived directly in every experience



